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Abstract — Ensuring data security while accessing data in the
cloud is a paramount importance. Due to data outsourcing and
untrusted cloud servers, the data access control becomes a
challenging issue in cloud storage systems. Ciphertext-Policy
Attribute-based Encryption (CP-ABE) is regarded as one of the
most suitable technologies for data access control in cloud
storage, because it gives data owners more direct control on
access policies. However, it is difficult to directly apply existing
CP-ABE schemes to data access control for cloud storage systems
because of the attribute revocation problem. In this paper, we
design an expressive, efficient and revocable data access control
scheme for multi-authority cloud storage systems, where there
are multiple authorities co-exist and each authority is able to
issue attributes independently. Specifically, we propose a
revocable multi-authority CP-ABE scheme, and apply it as the
underlying techniques to design the data access control scheme.
Our attribute revocation method can efficiently achieve both
forward security and backward security. The analysis and
simulation results show that our proposed data access control
scheme is secure in the random oracle model and is more
efficient than previous works.
Keywords — Access control, multi-authority, CP-ABE, attribute
revocation, cloud storage
I. INTRODUCTION
Among the services in the cloud, Cloud storage is an
important service of cloud computing [1], which offers
services for data owners to host their data in the cloud. This
new paradigm of data hosting and data access services
introduces a great challenge to data access control. Because
the cloud server cannot be fully trusted by data owners, they
can no longer rely on servers to do access control. Ciphertext-
Policy Attribute-based Encryption (CP-ABE) [2], [3] is
regarded as one of the most suitable technologies for data
access control in cloud storage systems, because it gives the
data owner more direct control on access policies. In CP-ABE
scheme, there is an authority that is responsible for attribute
management and key distribution. The authority can be the
registration office in a university, the human resource
department in a company, etc. The data owner defines the
access policies and encrypts data according to the policies.
Each user will be issued a secret key reflecting its attributes. A
user can decrypt the data only when its attributes satisfy the
access policies.
There are two types of CP-ABE systems: single-authority CP-
ABE [2], [3], [4], [5] where all attributes are managed by a
single authority, and multi-authority CP-ABE [6] where
attributes are from different domains and managed by
different authorities. Multi-authority CP-ABE is more
appropriate for data access control of cloud storage systems,
as users may hold attributes issued by multiple authorities and
data owners may also share the data using access policy
defined over attributes from different authorities. For
example, in an E-health system, data owners may share the
data using the access policy ‘‘Doctor AND Researcher’’,
where the attribute ‘‘Doctor’’ is issued by a medical
organization and the attribute ‘‘Researcher’’ is issued by the
administrators of a clinical trial. However, it is difficult to
directly apply these multi-authority CP-ABE schemes to
multi-authority cloud storage systems because of the attribute
revocation problem.
In multi-authority cloud storage systems, users’ attributes can
be changed dynamically. A user may be entitled some new
attributes or revoked some current attributes. And his
permission of data access should be changed accordingly.
However, existing attribute revocation methods[7] either rely
on a trusted server or lack of efficiency, they are not suitable
for dealing with the attribute revocation problem in data
access control in multi-authority cloud storage systems.
In this paper, we first propose a revocable multiauthority CP-
ABE scheme, where an efficient and secure revocation
method is proposed to solve the attribute revocation problem
in the system. As described in Table 1, our attribute
revocation method is efficient in the sense that it incurs less
communication cost and computation cost, and is secure in the
sense that it can achieve both backward security (The revoked
user cannot decrypt any new ciphertext that requires the
revoked attribute to decrypt) and forward security (The newly
joined user can also decrypt the previously published
ciphertexts1, if it has sufficient attributes). Our scheme does not
require the server to be fully trusted, because the key update is
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enforced by each attribute authority not the server. Even if the
server is not semi-trusted in some scenarios, our scheme can still
guarantee the backward security. Then, we apply our proposed
revocable multi-authority CP-ABE scheme as the underlying
techniques to construct the expressive and secure data access
control scheme for multi-authority cloud storage systems.
Compared to the conference version [8] of this work, we have the
following improvements:
1. We modify the framework of the scheme and make it more
practical to cloud storage systems, in which data owners are not
involved in the key generation. Specifically, a user’s secret key is
not related to the owner’s key, such that each user only needs to
hold one secret key from each authority instead of multiple secret
keys associated to multiple owners.
2. We greatly improve the efficiency of the attribute revocation
method. Specifically, in our new attribute revocation method,
only the ciphertexts that associated with the revoked attribute
needs to be updated, while in [8], all the ciphertexts that
associated with any attribute from the authority (corresponding to
the revoked attribute) should be updated. Moreover, in our new
attribute revocation method, both the key and the ciphertext can
be updated by using the same update key, instead of requiring the
owner to generate an update information for each ciphertext, such
that owners are not required to store each random number
generated during the encryption.
3. We also highly improve the expressiveness of our access
control scheme, where we remove the limitation that each
attribute can only appear at most once in a ciphertext.
We believe that sharing data among multiple users is perhaps
one of the most engaging features that motivate cloud storage.
Therefore, it is also necessary to ensure the integrity of shared
data in the cloud is correct. Existing public auditing
mechanisms can actually be extended to verify shared data
integrity. However, a new significant privacy issue introduced
in the case of shared data with the use of existing mechanisms
is the leakage of identity privacy to public verifiers.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
System Model
We consider a data access control system in multi-authority cloud
storage, as described in Fig. 1. There are five types of entities in
the system: a certificate authority (CA), attribute authorities
(AAs), data owners (owners), the cloud server (server) and data
consumers (users).
The CA is a global trusted certificate authority in the system. It
sets up the system and accepts the registration of all the users and
AAs in the system. For each legal user in the system, the CA
assigns a global unique user identity to it and also generates a
global public key for this user. However, the CA is not involved
in any attribute management and the creation of secret keys that
are associated with attributes. For example, the CA can be the
Social Security Administration, an independent agency of the
United States government. Each user will be issued a Social
Security Number (SSN) as its global identity.
Every AA is an independent attribute authority that is responsible
for entitling and revoking user’s attributes according to their role
or identity in its domain. In our scheme, every attribute is
associated with a single AA, but each AA can manage an
arbitrary number of attributes. Every AA has full control over the
structure and semantics of its attributes. Each AA is responsible
for generating a public attribute key for each attribute it manages
and a secret key for each user reflecting his/her attributes.
Figure 1: System model of data access control in multi-
authority cloud storage
Each user has a global identity in the system. A user may be
entitled a set of attributes which may come from multiple
attribute authorities. The user will receive a secret key associated
with its attributes entitled by the corresponding attribute
authorities.
Each owner first divides the data into several components
according to the logic granularities and encrypts each data
component with different content keys by using symmetric
encryption techniques. Then, the owner defines the access
policies over attributes from multiple attribute authorities and
encrypts the content keys under the policies. Then, the owner
sends the encrypted data to the cloud server together with the
ciphertexts. They do not rely on the server to do data access
control. But, the access control happens inside the cryptography.
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That is only when the user’s attributes satisfy the access policy
defined in the ciphertext; the user is able to decrypt the
ciphertext. Thus, users with different attributes can decrypt
different number of content keys and thus obtain different
granularities of information from the same data.
Security Model
In multi-authority cloud storage systems, we make the
following assumptions:
 The CA is fully trusted in the system. It will not collude
with any user, but it should be prevented from decrypting
any ciphertexts by itself.
 Each AA is trusted but can be corrupted by the adversary.
 The server is curious but honest. It is curious about the
content of the encrypted data or the received message, but
will execute correctly the task assigned by each attribute
authority.
 Each user is dishonest and may collude to obtain
unauthorized access to data.
III. OUR DATA ACCESS CONTROL SCHEME
Overview
To design the data access control scheme for multiauthority
cloud storage systems, the main challenging issue is to
construct the underlying Revocable Multiauthority CP-ABE
protocol. In [6], Chase proposed a multi-authority CP-ABE
protocol, however, it cannot be directly applied as the
underlying techniques because of two main reasons: 1)
Security Issue: Chase’s multi-authority CP-ABE protocol
allows the central authority to decrypt all the ciphertexts, since
it holds the master key of the system; 2) Revocation Issue:
Chase’s protocol does not support attribute revocation.
We propose a new revocable multi-authority CP-ABE
protocol based on the single-authority CP-ABE proposed by
Lewko and Waters in [9]. That is we extend it to
multiauthority scenario and make it revocable. We apply the
techniques in Chase’s multi-authority CP-ABE protocol [6] to
tie together the secret keys generated by different authorities
for the same user and prevent the collusion attack.
Specifically, we separate the functionality of the authority into
a global certificate authority (CA) and multiple attribute
authorities (AAs). The CA sets up the system and accepts the
registration of users and AAs in the system.7 It assigns a
global user identity uid to each user and a global authority
identity aid to each attribute authority in the system. Because
the uid is globally unique in the system, secret keys issued by
different AAs for the same uid can be tied together for
decryption. Also, because each AA is associated with an aid,
every attribute is distinguishable even though some AAs may
issue the same attribute.
To deal with the security issue in [6], instead of using the
system unique public key (generated by the unique master
key) to encrypt data, our scheme requires all attribute
authorities to generate their own public keys and uses them to
encrypt data together with the global public parameters. This
prevents the certificate authority in our scheme from
decrypting the ciphertexts.
Secret Key Generation
Each user uid is required to authenticate itself to the AAaid
before it can be entitled some attributes from the AAaid. The
user submits its certificate CertificateðuidÞ to the AAaid. The
AAaid then authenticates the user by using the verification key
issued by the CA. If it is a legal user, the AAaid entitles a set of
attributes Suid,aid to the user uid according to its role or identity
in its administration domain. Otherwise, it aborts. Then, the
AAaid generates the user’s secret key SKuid,aid by running the
secret key generation algorithm SKeyGen. It chooses a
random number tuid,aid € Zp and computes the user’s secret key
as
Data Decryption
All the legal users in the system can freely query any
interested encrypted data. Upon receiving the data from the
server, the user runs the decryption algorithm Decrypt to
decrypt the ciphertext by using its secret keys from different
AAs. Only the attributes the user possesses satisfy the access
structure defined in the ciphertext CT, the user can get the
content key.
Attribute Revocation
As we described before, there are two requirements of the
attribute revocation: 1) The revoked user (whose attribute is
revoked) cannot decrypt new ciphertexts encrypted with new
public attribute keys (Backward Security); 2) the newly joined
user who has sufficient attributes should also be able to
decrypt the previously published ciphertexts, which are
encrypted with previous public attribute keys (Forward
Security). For example, in a university, some archive
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documents are encrypted under the policy ‘‘CS Dept. AND
(Professor OR PhD Student)’’, which means that only the
professors or PhD students in CS department are able to
decrypt these documents. When a new professor/PhD student
joins the CS department of the university, he/she should also
be able to decrypt these documents. Our attribute revocation
methods can achieve both forward security and backward
security.
Communication Cost
The communication cost of the normal access control is
almost the same. Here, we only compare the communication
cost of attribute revocation. The communication cost of
attribute revocation in [13] is linear to the number of
ciphertexts which contain the revoked attribute
Computation Efficiency
We implement our scheme and DACC scheme on a Linux
system with an IntelCore 2 DuoCPU at 3.16GHz and 4.00 GB
RAM. The code uses the Pairing-Based Cryptography (PBC)
library version 0.5.12 to implement the access control
schemes. We use a symmetric elliptic curve α curve, where
the base field size is 512-bit and the embedding degree is 2.
The α -curve has a 160-bit group order, which means p is a
160-bit length prime. All the simulation results are the mean
of 20 trials.
We compare the computation efficiency of both encryption
and decryption in two criteria: the number of authorities and
the number of attributes per authority. Fig. 3a describes the
comparison of encryption time versus the number of
authorities, where the involved number of attributes per
authority is set to be 10. Fig. 3c gives the encryption time
comparison versus the number of attributes per authority,
where the involved number of authority is set to be 10. It is
easy to find that our scheme incurs less encryption time than
DACC scheme.
IV. RELATED WORK
Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) [2]-
[3] is a promising technique that is designed for access control
of encrypted data. There are two types of CP-ABE systems:
single authority CP-ABE [2], [3], [4], [5] where all attributes
are managed by a single authority, and multi-authority CP-
ABE [6], [7], [8] where attributes are from different domains
and managed by different authorities. Multi-authority CP-
ABE is more appropriate for the access control of cloud
storage systems, as users may hold attributes issued by
multiple authorities and the data owners may share the data
using access policy defined over attributes from different
authorities. However, due to the attribute revocation problem,
these multi-authority CP-ABE schemes cannot be directly
applied to data access control for such multi-authority cloud
storage systems.
To achieve revocation on attribute level, some re encryption-
based attribute revocation schemes [9], [10] are proposed by
relying on a trusted server. We know that the cloud server
cannot be fully trusted by data owners, thus traditional
attribute revocation methods are no longer suitable for cloud
storage systems. Ruj, Nayak and Ivan proposed a DACC
scheme [11], where an attribute revocation method is
presented for the Lewko and Waters’ decentralized ABE
scheme [8]. Their attribute revocation method does not require
a fully trusted server. But, it incurs a heavy communication
cost since it requires the data owner to transmit a new
ciphertext component to every non-revoked user.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a revocable multi-authority
CPABE scheme that can support efficient attribute revocation.
Then, we constructed an effective data access control scheme
for multi-authority cloud storage systems. We also proved that
our scheme was provable secure in the random oracle model.
The revocable multi-authority CPABE is a promising
technique, which can be applied in any remote storage
systems and online social networks etc.
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